

# The Phillips Curve and Policy Debates

ECON201 - Winter, '24

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# This Lecture

- Last lecture, we discussed how the government can increase aggregate demand in the short run and, thus, stabilize the economy.
- Today, we will take another look at monetary policy and the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.
- The Phillips Curve describes this tradeoff.
- Once again, distinction between short run and long run is crucial.
- Finally, we will apply what we learned to real policy debates.
- **Please fill out the course evaluation. Thank you!**

# Outline


## 1. The Phillips Curve

## 2. Costs of Monetary Policy



## 3. Four Policy Debates

# The Phillips Curve

- *The Phillips Curve*:  
Short-run negative correlation between inflation/nominal wages and unemployment.
- Originally studied in the UK by New Zealand economist A.W. Phillips.
- Low unemployment  $\rightarrow$  High AD  $\rightarrow$  Upward pressure on prices.
- Policy menu in terms of inflation/unemployment tradeoffs?




# Policy Tradeoff



- Shifts in AD move the economy along the Phillips Curve.
- Fiscal and monetary policy can choose a point along PC.

# Is The Phillips Curve Stable?


- Phillips Curve is short-run relationship!
- In long-run, inflation expectations adjust.  
→ Long-run PC is vertical.
- **Reason:** Monetary neutrality.
- Long-run PC = unemployment at natural rate.
- So, policy's ability to exploit PC depends on *unexpected* inflation.



# A Formula for the Phillips Curve

$$\text{Unemployment rate} = \text{Natural rate of unemployment} - a \left( \text{Actual Inflation} - \text{Expected Inflation} \right)$$

$$\underbrace{\text{Unemployment rate}}_y = \underbrace{\text{Natural rate of unemployment} + a \times \text{Expected Inflation}}_b \underbrace{\frac{-a}{+m} \times \text{Actual Inflation}}_x$$



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## 1. A Case Study




# A Case Study: The 1970s



- In late 1960s, the expansionary fiscal and monetary policy increased aggregate demand.<sup>a</sup>
- This led to substantial inflation.
- Initially, unemployment fell.
- But, starting in 1970, unemployment rates increased.

→ People expected high inflation, PC shifted up.

<sup>a</sup>Data: Bureau of Labor Statistics



# A Case Study: The 1970s



- Another reason for shifts in the PC are *adverse supply shocks*.
- In 1974, OPEC reduced global oil supply. This increased oil prices.
- U.S. economy relied on imported oil.
- Natural rate of unemployment  $\uparrow \rightarrow PC \uparrow$

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## 1. The Sacrifice Ratio

## 2. Rational Expectations

# Sacrifice Ratio

- *Disinflation*: Reduction in the rate of inflation.
- *Sacrifice Ratio*:  
The number of percentage points of annual output lost in the process of reducing inflation by 1 percentage point.
- Typical estimate of the sacrifice ratio = 5.
- **Example:**  
To reduce inflation from 10% to 4%, sacrifice 30% of annual output.

**Wait!** We just experienced this amount of disinflation. But, surely, output is not 30% lower...

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1. The Sacrifice Ratio

2. Rational Expectations

# Rational Expectations

- *Rational Expectations*:  
People optimally use all the information they have, including information about government policies, when forecasting the future.
  - Based on work of Barro, Sargent and Lucas. See *Lucas Critique*.
  - *Credible commitment* is all that is necessary to shift back the PC/expectations.
- If policymakers are credible, sacrifice ratio may be much lower.

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# Outline

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**3. Four Policy Debates**

**1. Spending Hikes vs.  
Tax Cuts**

2. Discretion vs. Rules

3. Zero Inflation Target

4. Budget Responsibility

5. Conclusions

# The Problem

- Recessions are associated with weak aggregate demand.
- Monetary policy can alleviate shortfalls in aggregate demand.
- However, monetary policy acts with a lag, may not be enough, and may be limited by ZLB.
- Thus, fiscal stimulus is needed.
- But what is more effective, tax cuts or spending hikes?

# Spending Hikes

- Spending hikes should have a higher multiplier.
- Initial spending adds to aggregate demand one-for-one.
- Tax cuts are attenuated by how much households save of the additional disposable income.
- Three types of quick government spending:
  - i. “shovel-ready” projects,
  - ii. compensation for state and local govt’s fall in tax revenue, and
  - iii. increased unemployment benefits.

# Tax Cuts

- Tax cuts are a quick way to increase aggregate demand.
- Lower taxes may also increase supply, especially corporate tax cuts.
- Tax cuts require less granular decisions/planning by the government. The potential waste is smaller.
- Different taxes can be cut to incentivize different behavior (e.g. decentralizing investment).

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# The Problem

- We learned that the Fed is independent. It has a lot of discretion and influence over the economy.
- The only constraint on the Fed is its mandate to “promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”
- Politically, this is undemocratic.
- Economically, it leaves a lot of ambiguity/uncertainty—not good for economic outcomes.
- Should the Fed is constrained by tighter rules?

# Rules-Based Policy

## – **Problems of Discretion:**

- i. Political influence (e.g. Nixon reelection 1972).
- ii. Time inconsistency may lead to higher inflation.  
People could expect central bankers to exploit Phillips Curve by reneging on policy announcements.

## – **Potential Policy Rules:**

- i. Fixed money supply growth rate.
- ii. Simple rule based on nominal GDP.
- iii. Explicit formula weighing different measures of policy objectives.

# Discretionary Policy

- Discretionary policy allows fast and creative problem solving.
  - Oil price shocks of 1970s.
  - Quantitative easing in 2007/2008.
  - Corporate bond purchases during Covid pandemic.
- Institutional design can minimize political influence.
  - Central bank independence (coventions).
  - Senate confirmations and long tenures.
  - Large, bipartisan committees (e.g. FOMC).
- Time inconsistency depends on perceptions of Fed's goals.
  - Since 2012, the Fed is committed to *inflation targeting*.
  - Price stability is perceived as Fed's primary goal.
  - Central bankers know how important credibility is.



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# Costs of Inflation

- Previously, we have seen that inflation is costly:
  - i. Shoeleather costs,
  - ii. menu costs,
  - iii. distortions of relative prices and tax thresholds,
  - iv. arbitrary redistribution of wealth related to nominal debt.
- The Fed's mandate is about price *stability*.
- Then, why does the Fed aim for 2% inflation, rather than none at all?

# Zero Inflation Policy

- To achieve price stability, the Fed would first need to reduce inflation → sacrifice some output.
- As expectations adjust, costs would fall.
- Price stability would have permanent benefits:
  - i. Less shoeleather and menu costs,
  - ii. make prices and related policies more predictable,
  - iii. reduce need for (costly) inflation-adjusted debt.
- Finally, 0% inflation is less arbitrary than 2%...

# Moderate Inflation Target

- Moderate inflation costs relatively low:
  - i. Expectations will adjust to stable inflation, and
  - ii. potential gains from "gaming" inflation are low.
- Central bank can undershoot target without risking deflation.
- With inflation, real prices/wages can be cut without decreasing them nominally.
- Zero Lower Bound and negative real interest rates:
  - i. Nominal interest rates cannot fall (much) below zero.
  - ii. **Fisher equation:**

$$\text{Real interest rate} = \text{Nominal interest rate} - \text{Inflation rate}$$

- iii. But, negative interest rates may help in recessions.

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
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
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# Debt-to-GDP




Debt data from the [U.S. Treasury](#). Annual GDP data from [FRED](#). NBER recessions underlayed in grey.

# Real Debt per Capita



Debt data from the [U.S. Treasury](#). Annual GDP data from [FRED](#). NBER recessions underlayed in grey.

# Debt as % of GDP per capita



Debt data from the [U.S. Treasury](#). Annual GDP data from [FRED](#). NBER recessions underlayed in grey.



# The Problem

- We have seen that budget deficits *crowd-out* private investment and reduce the fiscal multiplier.
- *Austerity* would reduce aggregate demand. Cause a recession?
- Reducing spending or increasing taxes will always harm someone's priorities.
- The U.S. had large deficits for a long time. How important is this really?

# Why Austerity?

- Running budget deficits decreases national saving → reduces private capital accumulation and future growth.
- Fiscal stimulus in recessions works best if the government can borrow cheaply. High debt makes debt more expensive.
- The higher the debt, the greater the share of taxes used to pay interest.
- High debt makes government more vulnerable to rising interest rates.

# How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb Debt

- Costs of debt cannot be seen in isolation. Debt may finance high-return spending (e.g. education).
- The costs of a austerity-caused recession may be much higher than the costs of the debt.
- Even debt of 100% of income is not actually that high relative to many private household debt.
- The U.S. should make use of its hegemony in international financial markets (i.e. low interest rates).

# A Note on Generational Justice

- The textbook argues that debt transfers financial burden from current generations to older generations.
- This is slightly misleading.
- No debt is truly intertemporal. While cashflows may only occur in the future, bonds are traded between currently living people.
- The true benefactors of government debt are bond holders, who get compensated for lending to the government.
- In the case of the U.S. government, these are wealthy individuals, financial institutions (esp. pension funds), and foreign governments.

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# Conclusion on Debates

- Spending hikes require more planning but tax cuts are less targeted.
- The Fed benefits from self-imposed rules but the strictures of simple rules would be harmful.
- Moderate but stable inflation is not much more costly, less risky and more flexible than zero inflation.
- High levels of debt are not bad *per se* but debt has real tradeoffs and distributional effects.

# Lecture Conclusions

- We have seen how monetary and fiscal policy can affect aggregate demand.
- Explored whether the Phillips Curve is a menu of unemployment/inflation tradeoffs.
- Phillips Curve is only stable in the short-run. In the long run, natural unemployment rate and inflation expectations matter.
- Credible policy commitment is crucial due to *rational expectations*.

# Thank You!

**Thank you for your participation!**

Please fill out the [course evaluation](#) and good luck for the final!